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found no evidence that such ordinance was essential to the public health
or safety. 20 Mention is often made of the fact that the air-travelling public
is a small part of the public. This is no longer true. Air travel is clearly an
interest of the public at large.
The field of height zoning seems to present us with the strange situation
of being universally upheld under the police powers, where such necessity
could be disputed, and yet airport zoning, which is for the single purpose
of safety, is often found invalid. This must be explained as the natural re-
luctance of the courts to impose restrictions on property, coupled with the
emergence of a relatively new industry. It can only be hoped that the courts
follow the lead of the legislatures and the few cases which have upheld such
zoning in the interests of the public health, safety and welfare, and not
limit the use control for airports to the easement device.
Clyde L. MacGowan*
20 Dutton v. Mendocino County, U.S. Av. 1 (Cal. 1949).
* Member, Second Year class.
GRANTOR'S RESERVATION OF POWER
TO MODIFY USE RESTRICTIONS
Subdividers are anxious to develop a uniform tract to assure purchasers
that their property values will be increased. Many times the subdivider
desires to give the grantees themselves the power to enforce these deed
restrictions, which they place in the deeds in order to maintain the uniform-
ity of the tract; yet at the same time wish to reserve to themselves some
power to alter these restrictions with changing times. The validity of these
reservations of power to alter restrictions has been severely questioned in
other jurisdictions, but California seems to accord them validity.
In the New Mexico case of Suttle v. Bailey,' the court held such a res-
ervation of a right in the grantor to alter, modify, or annul any restriction
in any of the grantee's deeds made the covenants and restrictions in the
deeds personal in nature and not of the type which run with the land. There
was, therefore, no mutuality of covenant between grantees, and one grantee
had no right to sue another in equity for breach of covenant. They held
that the clause in question destroyed the uniformity in the tract necessary
to uphold an equitable servitude because by exercising his power the
grantor will vary the restrictions in each deed and the necessary general
plan would be destroyed. In California, the requirement of tract uniformity
to create a valid equitable servitude was required by the early cases,2 but
this has been ignored by the later decisions. 3 California courts uniformly
hold that each deed in the tract must contain some express provision of
intent that the restrictions are for the benefit of the grantees.' The deed is
168 N.M. 283, 361 P.2d 325 (1961).
2 See Werner v. Graham, 181 Cal. 174, 183 Pac. 945 (1919). See also McBride v.
Freeman, 191 Cal. 152, 215 Pac. 678 (1923).
SCollani v. White, 38 Cal. App. 2d 539, 101 P.2d 767 (1940).
4See Wing v. Forest Lawn Cemetery Ass'n, 15 Cal. 2d 472, 101 P.2d 1099 (1940);
CAL. Cry. CoDE § 1468.
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the final muniment of the transaction and must express this intent before
any equitable right of enforcing a restriction will accrue to the grantees of
the subdivision. The majority rule,5 followed in Suttle, allows this intent
to be implied from the circumstance of tract uniformity, but California does
not so hold.
What effect does this added requirement for setting up equitable servi-
tudes have on the cases coming before the California courts? Once the re-
quirements for setting up the servitude are met, the California court will
uphold the servitude in the presence of a clause reserving a power in the
grantor to change, alter, or modify the restrictions in the deed."
Sharp v. Quinn- is in point with Suttle. In this case the grantor provided
certain building restrictions in all the deeds to lots in the tract and expressly
stated that these restrictions were for the benefit of all lot owners in the
tract. Further, the grantor provided that after sixteen lots had been sold,
the restrictions could be annulled, modified, or abrogated by the owners of
not less than sixteen of the lots in the tract. The agreement had to be in
writing and recorded. Sixteen of the lot owners executed and recorded a
writing abrogating the restrictions. The plaintiff was a lot owner but did
not join in the agreement. The court held that the clause was valid and
the restrictions as to all lot owners had been annulled. The deeds complied
with the requirements for setting up an equitable servitude and one was
set up prior to the execution of the clause. Prior to the execution of the
writing abrogating the restrictions, one grantee could obtain equitable en-
forcement of the restrictions against another grantee. In Suttle, no equi-
table servitude was set up because of the clause reserving the power to
change or modify, but the reservation itself was upheld. The court upheld
the power in the grantor but gave the grantees no right in equity to enforce
the restrictions. In the Sharp case the court recognized this right in the
grantees.
The most liberal decision of the California courts is Collani v. White.
8
The grantor set up building restrictions in the deeds and gave the grantees
within a specified area the right to enforce them. Further, he provided that
he reserved the right to create, make, apply or omit similar or varying con-
ditions in other lots sold in the tract. The grantor also reserved the right
to change or modify any restrictions in any grantees deed at his discretion.
The court upheld the plaintiff's (grantee) right to enforce the building re-
strictions against defendant (grantee). The court said that the grantors
intent was to set up the restrictions for the benefit of the other lot owners
and no consideration need be made of whether the covenants were personal
or whether they ran with the land. The court said that a subsequent pur-
chaser from the covenantor takes with notice of an existing equitable claim
or interest in favor of another, and that this interest may be enforced against
him. Here the court says that all that needs to be considered is whether
the intent is manifested and the purchaser took with notice. The court paid
no attention to the fact that tract uniformity would not be maintained since
5 Rowe v. May, 44 N.M. 264, 101 P.2d 391 (1940).
6 Sharp v. Quinn, 214 Cal. 194, 4 P.2d 942, 78 A.L.R. 501 (1931); Burkhardt v.
Lofton, 63 Cal. App. 2d 230, 146 P.2d 720 (1944).
7214 Cal. 194,4 P.2d 942, 78 A.L.R. 501 (1931).
838 Cal. App. 2d 539, 101 P.2d 767 (1940).
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